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THE EFFECT OF BUCKHANNON ON THE
AWARDING OF ATTORNEY FEES
Leon Friedman'

In 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v.

West Virginia

Department of Health and Human Resources,2 which destroyed the
so-called catalyst theory. The catalyst theory refers to the bringing
of a lawsuit, but prior to the conclusion of the suit, the defendant
settles with the plaintiff according to the plaintiffs basic original
demand for relief.'

Every circuit except the Fourth Circuit4 had

'Professor of Law. A.B., LL.B., Harvard University. Professor Friedman, a
former Associate at Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler, was Director of
the Committee for Public Justice and a Staff Attorney for the American Civil
Liberties Union. He has written briefs for many important Supreme Court cases
dealing with issues of the First Amendment, abuse of government power, and
criminal procedure. He has also served as the Associate Director of the
Committee on Courtroom Conduct of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. DISORDER INTHE COURTS, which he wrote with Professor Norman
Dorsen of New York University, is considered the leading work on that subject.
Professor Friedman is the former General Counsel for Chelsea House Publishers
and a leading copyright lawyer. He is the author of law journal and newspaper
articles and a number of books, one of which, THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969, received the Scribes Award as the outstanding
book on a legal subject during 1970.
532 U.S. 598 (2001).
Id. at 601. See also Stanton v. S. Berkshire Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574,
577 (1st Cir. 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995);
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 546-50 (3d Cir. 1994).
4 S-1 By & Through P-I v. State Bd. Of Educ. of North Carolina, 21 F.3d 49,
51 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding "[a] person may not be a 'prevailing party' . . .
except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or
settlement giving some of the legal relief sought. ... ").
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held that if you are a catalyst for a change in the defendant's
conduct, you "prevailed" in the suit.
should be entitled to legal fees.'

Therefore, the plaintiff

In Buckhannon, the Court

confirmed that a party must prevail in order to be entitled to legal
fees, and a voluntary change by the defendant does not establish
the legal requirement for obtaining fees.6 In other words, a party
must obtain an enforceable judgment or a consent decree, which is
the functional equivalent of a judgment, before it will be
considered a prevailing party relative to fees.
The Buckhannon case involved the issuance of an
injunction. The West Virginia Fire Marshall mandated that as a
requirement for consideration for placement in a nursing home, the
person had to be physically able to move himself or herself to
safety in case of a fire.7 A group brought an action on behalf of a
102 year old female resident of the nursing home who was unable
to climb down the fire escape unassisted.' In reaction to this

5 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
61d. at
7 d. at

610.

600.

Sld. at 601. The nursing home filed suit after receiving cease and desist orders
requiring closure of its residential care facilities within thirty days, on behalf of

itself, other similarly situated homes, and residents. Id.
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lawsuit, the state legislature amended the law to allow a resident to
stay in a nursing home even if unable to exit independently.9
Therefore, the amendment allowed her to remain in the nursing
home."° The group then sought additional relief on her behalf, and
the district court dismissed the case using the holding in S-1 By
and Through P-1 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina"
as its rationale. 2 Consequently, the case became moot because the
legislature amended the statute. 3 Thereafter, the group sought
attorney fees.
The Fourth Circuit held that no attorney fees were
obtainable because there was not an enforceable judgment. 4 The
United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held "[t]he
catalyst theory does not exist and a party cannot get fees as a
prevailing party unless there is a judgment in their favor or there is
a consent decree."' 5 The rationale for the Court's holding is that a
9Id.
'oBuckhahnon, 532 U.S. at 601.
" 21 F.3d at49.
12

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health &

Human Res., 19 F. Supp. 2d 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1998).

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., No. 99-1424, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 720, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2000).
13

4

aid

.
15Buckhannon,
532 U.S. at 610.
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consent decree involves a judicial officer approving an agreement.
Judges do not sign consent decrees unless they are sure there is
merit to the consent decree and, moreover, the consent decree
gives sufficient judicial imprimatur providing the court with
6
knowledge that the case had merit from the onset. 1

The question arose regarding what this theory applies to.
Does this apply, for example, to a monetary settlement?

What

happens if a party brings an action for money damages and is
awarded money damages, but for one reason or another the money
is not embodied either in a judgment, because the case was settled,
or in a consent decree? There are many reasons, however, why the
amount of money contained in a settlement is excluded from the
consent decree.

Many government agencies in this district, for

example, do not want to list or declare the amount of money that
they have settled for in an open court file because everyone will
have access to the information. A second reason is that judges do
not like to have secrets. There is a whole body of law that states
there should not be sealed files that indicate what people have
settled for.
6

d. at 605.
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In Freytes v. New York City Transit Authority,'7 the Transit
Authority settled a pregnancy disability claim. The Transit
Authority's

practice

regarding pregnant employees

was to

immediately relegate them to a lower paying job that avoided all
dangerous activities because of fear of their potential effect on the
pregnancy. 8 This resulted in reduced wages for these employees.
Consequently, an action was brought seeking five months back pay
plus emotional distress damages."'

After the completion of

discovery, the Transit Authority settled with the plaintiff, awarding
her the entire five months of back pay plus an additional $25,000
in emotional distress damages.2"
The ways in which settlements occur are very important
because the magistrate judge will conduct a settlement conference.
In this particular case, the occurrences at the settlement conference
were as follows. One person came in and asked, "Well, what is the
most you are willing to give?" The other party then responded,

7

1 Civ.

No. 01-9443 (2d Cir.) (pending).

"SBrief for Appellee at 32, Freytes v. New York City Transit Auth., Civ. No.
01-9443 (2d Cir.) (pending).
191d
20 Id. at 34.
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"What is the least you will take?" All of the parties were not in the
magistrate's chambers at the same time.

At the end of the

conference, the magistrate said, "Okay, we will settle for five
months back pay."

Then there was a dispute over whether five

months back pay consisted of twenty-one or twenty-two weeks. 2'
The reason for this dispute was a question of which five months
the parties were talking about.

For example, the month of

February has fewer days than the month of August. The parties
then wrote to the magistrate judge and she stated, "The parties
have agreed to abide by my decision, and I say it is twenty-one
weeks," and the magistrate judge signed at the bottom of the
attorney's letter.22 It was very important that the magistrate signed
the document.
Arguing this case in the Second Circuit, my first argument
was that Buckhannon does not apply to monetary settlements. If a
government agency awards a significant amount of money, which
was substantially similar to what was originally requested, that
alone should indicate that the case has merit. If judicial approval is

21 Id.
22

id.
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required, the fact that the magistrate judge arranged the settlement
should suffice for the judicial approval requirement. In addition,
the magistrate's signature was on the letter explaining what the
parties stipulated.

This, in effect, gives credence to the

presumption that the letter was intended as a settlement, and is,
therefore, the functional equivalent of a consent decree.
My

opponent,

Richard

Schoolman,

stated that

the

magistrate judge is not a judicial officer. This statement did not
receive a lot of acceptance by the Second Circuit.

Thus, the

question arose as to how formal this procedure must be.

The

Supreme Court's decision held that a consent decree is sufficient. 3
The first question that arises is whether or not Buckhannon
applies to monetary settlements. There are a couple of cases that
discuss a Rule 6824 offer of judgment." If a Rule 68 offer of

23
24

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.

Rule 68 provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party

defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an
offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending

party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the
offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the

service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that
the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and
notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not

614
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judgment is made and the opposing party accepts, the district court
must sign that judgment. 1-6 Under Rule 68, the clerk enters the
judgment. Therefore, the judge has no discretion over Rule 68
matters.

A judge never gets involved.

However, does this

procedure satisfy the Supreme Court's concern that the case had
merit? The Eleventh Circuit, in American DisabilityAssociation v.
Chmielarz,27 held that a Rule 68 judgment that is accepted by the

accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is
not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If
the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is
made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
When the liability of one party to another has been determined
by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of
the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings,
the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment,
which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial
if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days
prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the
amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Cv. P. 68.
25 See, e.g., Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
the

district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorney fees on
his Americans with Disabilities Act claim); Haworth v. Nevada, 56 F.3d 1048,
1052 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding Rule 68 did not preclude plaintiffs from
recovering attorney fees on their claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act;

however, they were precluded from recovering any fees incurred after the Rule
68 settlement offer); Lang v. Gates, 36 F.3d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that

plaintiff was not entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees after rejecting the
settlement offer).
26

FED. R. CIv. P. 68.

7 289

F.3d 1315 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
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opposing side is the functional equivalent of either a consent
decree or a judgment for purposes of satisfying Buckhannon.8
The second issue arising out of Buckhannon is the impact
of its holding on other areas. Buckhannon applies to civil rights
cases where money is given to a prevailing party, and the party
does not prevail unless it receives a judgment or a consent decree.

9

Judge Pauley just gave me his decision in Laprade v. Blackrock
FinancialManagement, Inc.3" a securities fraud case. In Laprade,
two parties announced a merger.

A security fraud caseworker

came in and said that the merger would be bad for the
shareholders.'

On the basis of this information, they did not

follow through with the merger? 2 Milberg Weiss, who brought the
action and filed the complaint, came in and stated, "Okay, we want
our attorney fees, we blocked the merger."

Does Buckhannon

apply in the securities fraud area? In Laprade, the court held that

2

ld. at

29

See Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding

1317.

plaintiffs' success in their § 1988 claim for the "storming" of their home by
police officers without warning or identifying themselves as officers of the law
was not significant enough to justify the granting of an award of attorney fees).
30 No. 99 Civ. 9288, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2002).
31 Id. at **5-6.
32 Id. at *6.
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Buckhannon does apply, and there were no recoverable fees.33 The
judge further stated that even if he were to look at the merits of the
fee application, he would decide that it had no merit because, in
fact, it was not a catalyst.

There were other reasons why the

merger did not go through.34
There are also cases involving the Endangered Species
Act."

Although the Endangered Species Act does not have a

prevailing party provision, it has a clause that allows a person to
achieve a certain result while not being totally successful in an
Endangered Species Act case.16 The Ninth Circuit recently held
that Buckhannon does not apply to the Endangered Species Act.37
One issue raised by Judge Meskill in our case was
regarding what happens to the nuisance value.

Looking only at

monetary cases, suppose a party brings a case for $1,000,000 and

Id. at *10.
d. at **16-17.
35 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531- 1543 (2000).
36 See RESTORE: The North Woods v. United States Dep't of the Interior,
No. 95-37-JD, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12154, at **11-12 (D.N.H. Aug. 4, 1995)
(holding that the environmentalists were entitled to the recovery of reasonable
attorney fees because they assisted the government in implementing and
complying with the Endangered Species Act, thus serving the public interest).
37 Oro Vaca, Inc. v. Norton, 55 Fed. Appx. 433, 436 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The
stipulations between the parties cannot, by their own terms, fulfill the merit
requirement required by the Court in Buckhannon.").
31

34
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settles for $1,000, is this merely nuisance value? My answer was,
"Well, if the $1,000 was in a consent decree, if it was actually in
the final settlement decree, the party is not bound by Buckhannon."
At that point, the district court judge must weigh the worth of the
legal services on a fee petition."

For example, the court awards

you $ 1. Even though you are the prevailing party, what is a
reasonable fee for someone who gets only $1? The reasonable fee
is nothing. Accordingly, this provides the defendant, regardless of
whether the defendant is a city or not, with fallback protection,
even where the monetary award settled for is minimal. Thus, the
defendant is allowed to assert that the plaintiff did not prevail or
there was limited success when the plaintiff submitted the fee
petition. The fee may be reduced on this basis.
However, plaintiffs attorney may deal with this issue by
providing for the fee in a retainer agreement." The Supreme Court
has stated that this is the correct way to alleviate the problem, so
long as the hourly rate does not extend beyond the forty percent

38

See, e.g., Gisbrecht v. 1arnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002); Cody v. Hillard

304 F.3d 767, 779 (8th Cir. 2002).
39 See, e.g., Merrick T. Rossein, Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses, C780
ALI-ABA 515, 546-47 (1993).
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mark.4" However, this will not stop an attorney if a case is settled
for $1,000. This will ordinarily allow an attorney to receive $400
out of that amount. An attorney may want a larger fee. Therefore,
in those cases where there is not a lot of money in the settlement,
an attorney may require a lump sum settlement. This leads us back
to the problem in Evans v. Jeff D.,4 where the whole question of
whether to give a lump sum to be split up any way the party wants
was thought to create an ethical problem before the Supreme Court
acted.42
Providing a private retainer agreement that discusses the
amount of fees to be paid is one alternative for dealing with this
situation. However, it will not solve the problem if the recovery
was for a low amount.

Therefore, attorneys, and in particular

plaintiffs' attorneys, must have the money recorded in the final
consent decree with the judge's signature.

Furthermore, the

consent decree should include a clause that this court retains
40 Id.
4 475
42

U.S. 717 (1986).
Id. at 727-28. The Court stated that although the attorney for the class

faced an "ethical dilemma" - waiving his statutory fee award as requested by the
defendant and getting the best relief for the class, when the defendant offered a
settlement higher than the attorney reasonably expected, the attorney's decision
to recommend accepting the settlement was the "highest standards of our
profession." Id.
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jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement.43 In Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that if
there is a settlement agreement that is not part of a decree where
the court retains jurisdiction, the parties merely have a contract.44
If the city, or whomever it is that the parties are dealing with, does
not assign, it is necessary to go to state court on a contract action
rather than return to the federal court. 5 Thus, a plaintiff's solution
to this problem is to include everything in the consent decree and
have the presiding judge sign the decree.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). The
Court explained that in order for the parties to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement, that agreement should be made "part of the order of
dismissal - either by separate provision (such as a provision 'retaining
jurisdiction' over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the
settlement agreement in the order." Id.
44 Id. at 381. The Court stated that:
The suit involves a claim for breach of a contract, part of the
consideration for which was dismissal of an earlier federal
suit. No federal statute makes that connection (if it
constitutionally could) the basis for federal court jurisdiction
over the contract dispute. The facts to be determined with
regard to such alleged breaches of contract are quite separate
from the facts to be determined in the principal suit, and
automatic jurisdiction over such contracts is in no way
essential to the conduct of federal court business.
43

Id
41

Id. at 381-82 ("[W]e think the court is authorized to embody the settlement

contract in its dismissal ordcr . . . or retain jurisdiction over the settlement

contract, if the parties agree. Absent such action, however, enforcement of the
settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis
for federal jurisdiction.").
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DISCUSSION BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What if there is a private settlement in a
class action that needs to be approved by the judge? Can the judge
approve such a private settlement agreement and dismiss the
substantive claim?

PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: In class actions, the judge has
extremely broad discretion to decide who a prevailing party is and
to determine the appropriate fee.46 In the In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation,4 7 the Second Circuit held explicitly
that the district court has very broad power to decide what a
reasonable fee is in a class action, common fund case.48 Recently,

46

See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) where the Court noted:
The court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be
eliminated, or it may simply reduce the [fee] award to account
for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in
making this equitable judgment .... We emphasize that the
district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee
award.

Id.

818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 232 ("[T]he district court then may, in its discretion, upwardly or
downwardly adjust this figure by considering such factors as the quality of
counsel's work, the probability of success of the litigation and the complexity of
the issue.") (citing Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.
1977)).
47
41
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Judge Pauley held in Laprade that "the balance of equities
militates against awarding her attorneys' fees.

49

A district court

judge under the governing law is provided with much more
discretion to decide when the case is a common fund case. Thus,
the district court judge decides how much the attorneys really
deserve out of the common fund. Even if it is not a common fund
case, a district court judge is provided with a vast amount of
discretion under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: How do you distinguish between the
government giving the plaintiff something of value, such as a
public benefit or a license, and the defendant giving the plaintiff
money? I agree with you that there is language in Buckhannon that
may allow you to argue that it is limited to claims for prospective
relief, but in principle it would seem to present the same type of
problem.

49

Laprade, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418, at * 12.
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PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: It is a lot easier to figure out the
economic value of money as opposed to the economic value of a
path to the river. Under these circumstances, it is much easier to
apply the normal rules for determining attorney fees.

In

determining attorney fees, the following questions are asked: how
much did you receive; how do you measure that amount of money;
how does this compare to what you were looking for; and was it
limited success or was it unlimited success? In other words, there
are some measures or criteria that allow you to use the normal
attorney fee criteria for determining a fee.

JUDGE PRATT: Apart from calculating the amount, I believe that
the problem in Buckhannon was that they were trying to get the
government to act in a certain manner and the government went
ahead and did it. Presumably the government was supposed to
carry out these activities.

However, when paying money, the

government is not supposed to pay money to private citizens unless
they have a real obligation to do so that comes from the outside.
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PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: However, this is not how the
Supreme Court concluded the issue.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The reason for their conclusion may
be that the government might owe the plaintiff money.

PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: The Supreme Court stated that it does
not want meritless lawsuits brought where a government, in order
to avoid paying a substantial amount of attorney fees at its
conclusion, just settles the lawsuit.5

This is why a consent decree,

which is the judicial imprimatur that the case had merit, is
necessary. When monetary compensation is involved, it is easier
to figure out the outcome. The prevailing plaintiff is allowed to
file the fee application, and then it is determined whether the value
is merely a nuisance.

If it is found to be nuisance value, the

criteria of Hensley v. Eckerhart5' and its progeny should be

5"Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605-06.
"' 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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Therefore, the attorney receives a nominal amount in

2

fees.1

5
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2 Id. at 440.

